I have yet to get my hands on Murphy’s book though I hope to eventually. One question. In her critique of the linguistic Thomists does she make much of the relative absence in their treatments of the rich notions of causality working “behind the scenes”, so to speak, of Aquinas’ account of analogy, the (non)relationship of God and creatures, and his account of intelligibility (light)?

I completely agree on that point and was actually planning on mentioning that in a future post. Murphy does in fact actually provide an exposition of Balthasar’s ‘Miracle of Being and the Fourfold distinction’ and lauds it as a contemporary updating of the proofs of God. But since this section of Balthasar’s work is essentially an extrapolation of the significance of the ‘real distinction’ or ontological difference, this seems a little at odds with Murphy’s earlier criticisms of some Thomists for concentrating their efforts on the argument from contingency. (Although Murphy does believe each of Aquinas’ ways to be implicitly present in Balthasar’s four distinctions).

I have yet to read Przywara, although Ken Oakes, just finishing his PhD at Aberdeen on Barth on the Relationship of Philosophy and Theology, has convinced me of his profound significance. On problem with placing this so as so central to Thomas is that the doctrine occupies so little space in the Summa.

So what I’m wondering is if the reductionism is inherent in their position or whether the fullness of transcendence is just not fully developed in the “grammarian Thomists” thought? To put it in language of Charles Taylor, have they reduced the form to a code? Murphy is helping me see some limitations that I haven’t seen before related, for instance, to Webster’s criticism that Lindbeck places Scripture under ecclesiology rather than soteriology. Yet I also wonder whether the supposed reductionism isn’t also a manifestation of Thomas’s apophaticism and understanding of the eschatological fullfillment of knowledge of God.

I just finished chapter 2, and have other work to do. I will have to go back through the book again -it is worth a careful read.

Peace,
John Wright

I think Murphy would perhaps see Lindbeck’s attempt to steer through doctrinal concerns by emphasizing the linguistic aspect as opposed to their ontological ‘depth’ as evading the real differences that separate us. In other words, it misses the truly important issues.

I think her main contention with the grammatical Thomists is that they are somewhat reductionist. One issue that would be of great important I feel, is that of the doctrine of analogy. Thomists such as Herbert McCabe and Ralph McInerny wish to say that this is only a ‘doctrine’ about our use of language rather than having any real ontological significance. Whereas of course, in the Catholic tradition in general, the analogy of being has been given great weight and in modern times has been given excellent articulation by thinkers such as Przywara and von Balthasar whom Murphy is heavily indebted to.

I believe one of her principle concerns is that the ‘linguistic turn’ loses sight of these important issues. Perhaps this isn’t truly the case with Lindbeck (I’m personally not that well acquainted with his thought other than through his influence on the theology of religions).

David

It seems to me, at least in the beginning, that Murphy moves her criticism very quickly from Burrell and Lindbeck to Robert Jensen. She doesn’t note the significance of Victor Preller.

In reading the article by Joseph Incandella in Grammar and Grace today, Incandela speaks of the “analogy” between Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblance” with Thomas’ doctrine of analogy. While I think Murphy correctly notes that the “grammar Thomists” concentrate on how language works rather than the transcendence in which language forms us to participate, I think Incandella’s point shows that this possibility is there for this “grammatical turn” in Thomas.

Her criticisms of Lindbeck’s preoccupation with “theory” and “method” seem to me to ignore the ecumenical context of Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine. I’ve read the best summary of this book in an article in Analytic Thomism (Ashgate, 2006) by Nicholaus Healy called, “Three Theological Appropriations of Anayltic-Philosophical Readings of Thomas Aquinas”. Healy rightfully shows how truth is not merely an intrasystematic statement for Lindbeck precisely because of his commitment to Thomas. Healy writes, “The matter is made more complex because Lindbeck’s understanding of truth is similar to Aquinas’s. Truth is the correspondenc eof the mind with reality and so is located in the person rather than directly in the sentence. The truth of a sentence as spoken, then, is not completely determined by the words of teh sentence and their relation to reality. The meaning of a sentence, and thus its truthfulness, is governed by its use, and good use is determined by the rules of the community. In all linguistic communities it takes time to acquire the skills needed to use language well . . . it is the whole person who corresponds truthfully with reality not merely the mind: the ‘mentalisomorphism of the knowere and the known can be pictured as part and parcel of a wider comformity of the self to God.’ These who are ‘experts’ in Christianity — the saints — tend to speak and act in Christian ways unreflectively; they have what Aquinas calls connatural knowledge. . . . When they speak, they do so truly because they are in themselves in accord with Christian doctrine and practice and thus they correspond with the reality of which they speak” (p. 42).

It seems to me that Murphy focuses just on one layer of Lindbeck’s understanding of language (ie, doctrine) and then criticizes it as merely “grammatical” rather than “substantial.” I think that, in one sense, that she is correct — Lindbeck does not emphasize the ontological truthfulness of the theological language of the saint, but this is because he is working on ecumenical relations, how to achieve visible reunion of the church without capitulation to previous doctrinal statements.

Sorry to ramble, but I’m trying to figure out Murphy’s real criticism of the “grammatical Thomists”. Does this make any sense to you?

John Wright